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EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION
MAKING AID WORK
Despite years of spending in the name
of ‘development’, the persistence of
deep and widespread poverty in the
vast majority of developing countries is
far more striking than the handful of
success stories. This has not stopped
governments around the world making
a series of bold commitments in the
past few years – not just to the idea of
reducing poverty but to its wholesale
eradication.
Such initiatives as the United
Nations’ Millennium Development
Goals, the Prime Minister’s Commission
for Africa and various campaigns to
cancel poor countries’ debt and 
‘make poverty history’ indicate a
growing sense of urgency about
tackling this most challenging of
global policy problems. Last year saw a
string of summits devoted to
development, culminating in the World
Trade Organisation’s ministerial
conference in December, which sought
to conclude the so-called ‘Doha
Development Agenda’.
So can today’s renewed spirit of
optimism in our ability to do something
about world poverty be sustained by
some tangible achievements? A decade
ago, Peter Boone, the author of the
lead article in this issue of CentrePiece,
did pioneering work that revealed the
failure of large aid flows either to raise
growth or reduce poverty. In the hope
that things will be different this time,
he urges a far more scientific approach
to aid projects, with returns estimated
in advance and their effectiveness
carefully monitored.
CEP researchers Tony Venables and
Alan Winters have featured in another
debate central to development – the
impact of trade liberalisation on
economic performance – which has been
rumbling through the letters pages of
the Financial Times. As a contribution to
more informed discussion of the subject,
some of the key articles have now been
made available on the Royal Economic
Society's website: http://www.res.org.uk/
tradeliberalisation.
And following the success of our
background briefings to debates in the
UK General Election campaign, we have
launched a series of Policy Analyses
with a broader international focus. The
first two, published on our website
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk) in December,
provided research evidence to inform
discussion of the European Union’s
budget and the Doha Round, both of
which centred on arguments about
agricultural protection, another big
challenge for development.
Elsewhere in this magazine are new
findings from other core elements of
our research agenda – productivity,
education and the labour market – plus
work on crime and police resources and
on mental illness. As always, your
comments on any of these reports
would be very welcome.
Romesh Vaitilingam
Editor
romesh@compuserve.com
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L
arge foreign aid flows
are making a
comeback. In the
past year, the
members of the G-8
have promised to
increase aid by 
$50 billion annually by 2010, the
European Union has promised to raise aid
to 0.7% of GDP by 2015, while Live8,
Tony Blair’s Commission for Africa and Bill
Clinton’s Global Initiative have brought
greater public awareness to the pressing
problem of extreme poverty. 
Jeffrey Sachs’ book, The End of
Poverty, is a brutally compelling document
outlining the case for more funds. The
situation he describes is dire: over 8,000
people die daily from AIDS having never
received adequate antiretroviral therapies;
and a further 27,000 children die each day
from preventable infectious diseases and
birthing problems. While in most parts of
the world, extreme poverty is on the
decline, in sub-Saharan Africa, the number
of extremely poor has doubled, to 300
million, in the last 20 years. Sachs’ book
focuses on the need for much larger
funding to end this ‘poverty trap’, calling
for an increase of funding from $65 billion
now to $135 billion in 2006. 
Will more aid work? 
Sachs is making an enormous contribution
to the goal of poverty reduction by
outlining poverty’s terrible human impact.
Indeed, given the scale of the problem
and the relatively small effort that western
countries make to help solve it, it seems
cruel, bordering on immoral, to question
whether more aid will work.
But critical analysis combined with
action is essential to make sure we really
do solve the problem. Unfortunately for
Sachs, there is one very large problem
with his plan: the history of large aid flows
is, to date, a major failure. 
In research I completed with CEP
colleagues over a decade ago, we
examined the relative performance of 96
countries to see whether increased aid
flows led to higher growth or more rapid
improvement in health indicators such as
child mortality. The answer was clear:
between 1970 and 1993, countries that
received large aid flows fared no better
than countries that received small aid
flows either in terms of growth or
measures of extreme poverty such as 
child mortality. 
Subsequent research with more recent
data has confirmed this finding. For
example, in well-publicised studies, Craig
Burnside and David Dollar at the World
Bank used the same data I used to modify
the argument. After dividing countries into
categories according to quality of
economic policies, they concluded that
countries with ‘good economic policies’
did benefit from aid though for most
countries, the benefit was small.
This research was used by the World
Bank to justify more targeted aid. But the
conclusions were later shown to be a
statistical fluke. When William Easterly and
others extended the dataset by an
additional five years, Burnside and Dollar’s
results disappeared, with the conclusion
again being that cross-country data
suggest larger aid flows don’t raise growth
or improve health, better economic
policies notwithstanding.
Focusing aid on what works 
The aid successes with which we are all
familiar – the eradication of smallpox,
vaccination programmes, antibiotics and
emergency disaster aid to relieve famines –
are important, but they’ve never been part
of a case for large aid flows.
Indeed, these policies are cheap to
implement and make up a small portion of
all aid flows. In 2004, 4% of bilateral aid
went to health, 12% to education and
Effective
intervention:
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The history of large aid flows
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6% to emergencies. The largest category
is ‘economic infrastructure’, which receives
23% of total funds. The remaining aid is
divided among a large number of small
projects including civil society, trade
promotion and administration.
In my view, the failures from the past
are too often glossed over by aid
advocates. Careful after-the-fact
evaluations of aid projects by donors are
rare, and when they are done, they are
usually flawed by the standards of
scientific analysis. This reluctance to make
careful assessments may actually be
counterproductive.
Sachs criticises former US Treasury
Secretary Paul O’Neill for stating: ‘We’ve
spent trillions of dollars on these programs
and we have damn near nothing to show
for it.’ In a recent survey, the UK public
appeared to side with O’Neill: 83% of
respondents thought aid would be wasted
by recipient governments. But as the
favourable public reaction to Live8 seems
to show, the problem is not that the many
critics don‘t believe in the moral agenda:
rather they don‘t believe we‘ve found a
means to solve that agenda through large
aid flows.
I’ve recently helped found an
organisation, Effective Intervention, which
sponsors programmes in Africa and Asia
aimed at reducing extreme poverty. We’ve
spent the last year examining alternative
sectors and projects to decide where
interventions can be most effective. We
are presently helping design several
projects in India and Africa that target
large, inexpensive improvements in child
health. We hope this research will
contribute to a better understanding of
how to reduce extreme poverty cheaply,
and potentially improve allocation of aid
budgets.
Reducing child mortality
Let’s start by looking at what really can be
achieved, and without too much money.
Figure 1 illustrates the percentage of
children that die before the age of 5 in
low- and middle-income countries. In
Niger, Malawi and Ethiopia, more than
10% of children die before the age of 5.
This contrasts with Cuba and Sri Lanka,
where fewer than 2% die. 
Figure 2 shows child mortality rates
across states in India and makes a similar
point. Despite having the same national
political and legal system, and similar
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Figure 1:
Comparing child mortality rates (deaths per 1,000 children
aged 0 to 5) with incomes across countries
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Figure 2:
Comparing child mortality rates (deaths per 1,000 children
aged 0 to 5) with incomes across states in India
C
h
il
d
 m
or
ta
li
ty
 r
at
e
GDP per capita
C
h
il
d
 m
or
ta
li
ty
 r
at
e
Per capita net state domestic product ('000 rupees 1996)
KEY
AND Andhra Pradesh
ARU Arunachal Pradesh
ASS Assam
BIH Bihar
DEL Delhi
GOA Goa
GUJ Gujarat
HAR Haryana
HIM Himachal Pradesh
IND India
JAM Jammu
KAR Karnataka
KER Kerala
MAD Madhya Pradesh
MAH Maharashtra
MAN Manipur
MEG Meghalaya
MIZ Mizoram
NAG Nagaland
ORI Orissa
PUN Punjab
RAJ Rajasthan
TAM Tamil Nadu
TRI Tripura
UTT Uttar Pradesh
BEN West Bengal
KEY
CMR Cameroon
CUB Cuba
GNB Guinea Bissau
MWI Malawi
MRT Mauritania
MDA Moldova
NPL Nepal
ZAF South Africa
LKA Sri Lanka 
SWZ Swaziland
UZB Uzbekistan
VNM Vietnam
Donors have never adopted the scientific discipline
needed to measure carefully how well their projects work
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levels of income across states, there are
striking differences in child mortality. The
state of Rajasthan has child mortality rates
similar to the poorest sub-Saharan African
countries, while Kerala has achieved levels
that are not far from Western Europe. 
The success of Kerala, Cuba, Sri Lanka,
Costa Rica and many socialist countries is
even more striking because it has been
achieved in very different political and
economic systems. The Cuban health
system benefited from a socialist revolution
that was instigated by paediatricians. They
built a state-funded health system largely
from scratch. The success in Kerala is more
complex, but today is based on a private
healthcare system. Roughly three-quarters
of medical care in Kerala comes from the
private sector. In all these cases, the total
healthcare spending of these states is
roughly equal to the average for low-
income countries. Good healthcare can 
be cheap.
I have no doubt that we can fairly
rapidly achieve the success of Kerala in
other regions of India and in sub-Saharan
Africa. The Bellagio Child Survival Papers,
a series of reports by leading global
medical and healthcare experts published
in The Lancet, concluded that 70% of
child mortality in low-income countries
could be eliminated through universal
access to 23 basic health interventions and
treatments. The measures these studies
specified are not expensive, but they
require enormous institutional change in
many countries. The conclusions are not
surprising once the cause of death is
understood: nearly all child deaths in low-
income countries are from treatable
causes, such as diarrhoea, pneumonia and
infections acquired during birth. 
At Effective Intervention, our furthest
advanced programme is in tribal regions of
Andhra Pradesh in India. In this extremely
poor region, 6% of children die before
they reach one month of age. Roughly
70% of these deaths are attributed to
infections (mostly due to unclean
procedures used when cutting the
umbilical cord and subsequent care of the
belly button) and poor procedures at
delivery that lead to birth asphyxiation.
Together with the Naandi Foundation
and colleagues at the London School of
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, we are
planning a multi-year trial that aims to
reduce neonatal mortality by 50%. The
programme focuses on improving
antenatal care services, and raising
education for village health workers and
mothers. Since most neonatal deaths are
caused by simple problems related to
hygiene and delivery, there is good reason
to believe that better education and
techniques will go a long way to reducing
mortality rates. 
We’ve designed the intervention on
the model of a pharmaceutical drug trial
that would meet the highest standards of
credibility set by the US Food and Drug
Administration and comparable European
regulators. We’ll implement the
programme in a region with a population
of roughly 300,000, randomising villages
and including a control group that initially
receives no interventions.
Once our project has achieved a large
reduction in neonatal mortality in the
intervention area, as assessed by an
independent data monitoring committee,
we will then expand it to cover the control
region. In this manner, we will be able to
measure our success carefully. If we can‘t
achieve a large mortality reduction relative
to the region where implementation is
delayed, there‘s little purpose in expanding
it. If we can achieve it, we can make a case
for expanding the programme in similar
regions elsewhere in India. 
What does all this cost? The surprising
answer is very little. The recurring costs of
the project will be around $80,000 a year.
We could expand such a programme to all
of Africa for under $500 million a year. Of
course we need to prove such a
programme could work in different regions,
and it would have to be modified, but the
point is that large-scale reduction in child
mortality can be achieved. Costs are not
the issue: the much bigger problem is
designing projects with specified, verifiable
results, and creating the institutional
structures to achieve such results. 
The murky side of water
infrastructure
So what’s going wrong? If there are cheap
means to reduce extreme poverty by
addressing neonatal deaths and child
mortality, why are we not focusing on
those? Part of the problem is that the
donor agencies have not adequately
attempted to allocate aid where we know
it works, and to complicate matters, they
have never adopted the scientific discipline
needed to measure carefully how well
their projects work. 
One of the first areas we looked into
at Effective Intervention was investing in
water infrastructure. This includes drilling
wells, providing pumps and possibly pipes,
so that households can have improved
water sources. The potential benefits seem
large: infectious diseases cause the bulk of
child mortality in extremely poor regions,
and these diseases can be prevented
through better hygiene. 
Water infrastructure varies sharply
throughout India, and there are good data
from national health surveys on household
disease and mortality. So in regions with
improved water quality (after controlling
for incomes and education), do we see a
Large-scale
reductions 
in child
mortality
rates can 
be achieved
at relatively
low cost
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large reduction in child deaths or
infectious disease? Based on surveys of
90,000 households across India, we’ve
found that access to improved water
supply has very little impact on the
incidence of disease: you get sick as often
whether you have improved water
supplies or not. 
The reason water supply fails to
reduce the incidence of disease probably
relates to multiple causes, including failure
to service infrastructure properly, and
contamination in storage containers at
home, but also to the importance of
hygiene. A systematic review by Val Curtis
and Sandy Cairncross concludes that
washing hands with soap (and presumably
hygiene in general) is more important than
infrastructure at reducing morbidity. You
can wash your hands with dirty water, but
as long as you use soap, you will avoid
much disease – and it is much less costly.
It seems that clean water is not necessary
to reduce disease substantially.
Despite the weak evidence linking
water infrastructure to mortality and
disease, there are large projects in
progress and being planned. For example,
in Uganda, a US consulting firm estimated
the country needed $2 billion in aid to
modernise its water infrastructure. It may
be easier to build a water system than to
build sustainable rural healthcare and
related education, but the evidence
indicates it would not be wiser. 
Getting aid to the 
right projects
The difficulty with water infrastructure
highlights a key problem with aid
programmes. To do them well, we need to
be far more rigorous in deciding where to
allocate money, and also ensuring that
results are achieved. This requires a
scientific approach to projects: we need to
estimate returns in advance, monitor
outcomes and design our projects so that
we learn as we go.
The Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC) is a good example of an attempt to
allocate aid better. The MCC selects
countries that have good records on ‘ruling
justly, encouraging economic freedom, and
investing in people’ using independent
rankings derived from 16 indicators. They
offer the selected countries large grants to
finance programmes that are
‘transformational’. The programmes are
selected by the national government, but
they must be based on a nationwide
consultative process. Each individual project
needs to demonstrate that it will generate
large positive economic returns before it
can be agreed.
The actual proposals by each country
are readily available on the MCC website
(http://www.mca.gov) and make
interesting reading. The bulk of the
projects are for infrastructure and generally
in areas where it is hard to assess the
benefits. But the MCC is making a valiant
effort to measure potential returns
rigorously, and then monitor
implementation and outcomes. They have
rejected many projects because, after
careful analysis, they found them to be
uneconomical. This is a big step forward. 
One weakness of the MCC is that they
only provide funds to a select group of
countries: the extremely poor live in many
countries that do not satisfy MCC criteria.
What’s more, the organisation limits funds
to five-year allocations, so, for example,
long-term projects aimed at improving
healthcare and education could not be
funded beyond five years. To solve the
problem of the extremely poor, we need
to select effective projects, and target
funds to reach them also. 
Ensuring it is the 
poor who benefit
Sachs’ book is more concerned with total
spending than the allocation of spending
across sectors, and there is not much on
how to ensure that the poor directly
benefit. But one of his most contentious
comments is that ‘development economics
is like eighteenth century medicine, when
doctors used leeches to draw blood from
their patients, often killing them in the
process,’ meaning that, in their crusade
against profligacy, the IMF and the World
Bank advise poor countries to raise taxes
and cut spending, thus actually bleeding
those countries of the funds they need to
fight poverty. 
Sachs’ solution is to change the aid
allocation process radically: national
governments should design multi-sector
programmes that aim to reduce extreme
poverty, the United Nations should
coordinate donors, and multilateral and
bilateral agencies should find as much
funds as needed to back all worthy
programmes. To buttress his arguments,
he mentions five poverty reduction
programmes completed by Ethiopia,
Ghana, Kenya, Senegal and Uganda,
which he believes are of high quality and
demonstrate how a revamped aid
allocation system could work.
I took a close look at Ethiopia’s three-
year Sustainable Development and Poverty
Reduction Programme published in 2002.
Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in
the world. Roughly 10% of children die
before one year of age, and only 30% of
the rural population is literate. The country
suffers a major AIDS epidemic. Their
programme is described in 225 pages,
including significant sections on AIDS,
schooling and child health and a plan for
very large spending on agriculture. There
are also a few specific targets but these are
goals rather than well-defined endpoints
linked to projects. Despite the broad
nature, a careful read raises questions as to
whether this sufficiently addresses our goal
of reducing extreme poverty.
Simple hygiene like
washing hands with soap
is more important than
water infrastructure in
reducing disease
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In the document, Ethiopia’s fiscal
programme specifies how expenditures
will be allocated. In 2005, already three
years into the planned programme, the
government expects to raise 22% of GDP
in revenues, but spend 33% of GDP,
leaving a budget deficit of 11% of GDP
to be financed mostly by external debt
and grants. 
Of this spending, 3.8% of GDP is
allocated to education and 1.1% to
health. The GDP of the country is $8
billion, so roughly $90m goes to health or
a little over $1 per capita. While the
document claims that the priorities and
goals of the programmes were the result
of widespread grassroots discussion and
meetings, I find it hard to believe that the
extremely poor had much say in the
process. In a country with one of the
highest child mortality rates in the world
and a major AIDS epidemic, can we really
believe the population is satisfied to have
one of the lowest health budgets (in
absolute terms and as a percentage of
national expenditures) in the world? 
This raises one of the most difficult
issues in aid allocation: given the nature of
national elites and the ambitions of the
nation-state, it is unlikely that poverty
reduction will trump other priorities
anywhere, even in desperately poor
countries. When giving aid, we need to
recognise that we are actually setting
different goals from those of the
recipient’s political system, so working
through a national development plan
designed by the central government may
simply be the wrong way to start.
Targeting aid to reach people
in extreme poverty
The Global Fund to fight AIDS, malaria
and tuberculosis, which Sachs deserves
credit for helping create, is a good
example. The Fund finances AIDS
prevention and antiretroviral therapies in
recipient countries. To be eligible for
funding, recipients need to come up with
a credible programme agreed in a broad
cross-section of the country. The
implementation is monitored carefully, and
the Fund has teeth: work in Uganda and
Burma was suspended recently when it
looked like local administrations were
preventing success. 
The advantage of the Fund structure is
that it takes some of the politics out of aid
allocation: recipients know there is money
available for a specific project that alleviates
extreme poverty, and the donor agency has
a clear guideline as to what should be
achieved. There is a good scientific basis for
believing that AIDS prevention strategies
are cost effective and highly important for
reducing extreme poverty. It seems this
model, which can be applied to all
countries, provides a good blueprint for
more expanded targeting of aid.
While Sachs criticises the existing
development economics paradigm
practised by aid agencies, he could easily
have extended the criticism to the broad
array of untested projects that we
currently implement as aid. While
programmes have improved in recent
years, we still have far to go if we are truly
to target funds to the problems we believe
they can best address.
I’ve argued that we need to revamp
our aid allocation process if we are to
achieve our goal to reduce extreme
poverty. Specifically, we should allocate far
more aid to areas where we have good
scientific evidence that it works, and we
should do this through well-designed
institutions like the MCC and the Global
Fund, which have a mandate to measure
and monitor outcomes carefully. We also
need to take much more care to evaluate
and monitor the impact of large
infrastructure projects, such as roads,
water supply and electricity, given their
poor track record and relatively high costs.
Through such mechanisms, we could
dramatically improve child health and
related education, along with greatly
reducing the burden of AIDS. But we need
to focus this aid where it is needed. Africa
has seen major improvements in child
healthcare, literacy and education over the
last 20 years, and most African countries
are richer than they ever have been. The
continent is now the fastest growing
market in the world for mobile telephones,
and it looks set to benefit from a long-
term recovery in commodity prices, along
with demand for West African offshore oil,
as India and China grow.
The problem is not that Africa will be
mired in poverty without aid, but rather
that there is a large population of
extremely poor households who are being
left behind. This makes it all the more
imperative that we target aid at these
groups, and make sure it works.
Peter Boone is a research associate in CEP’s
globalisation programme and the chair of
Effective Intervention (http://www.effint.org).
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W
hat has been the
impact of
information and
communication
technologies (ICT)
on productivity? This has been a burning
question for policy-makers and business
leaders for several decades. But it is only
in recent years that computer power itself
has enabled researchers to conduct the
statistical interrogation of large-scale
datasets on firms that can give us some
more definitive answers. In this article, 
we report and synthesise some of the
main messages emerging from this new
line of research.
Perhaps the most intriguing finding
comes from examining the use of ICT by
global businesses. Multinational enterprises
in general and US multinationals in
particular appear to have higher
productivity, and this seems to be linked to
a distinct pattern in their use of ICT.
This fact may help unravel some of the
puzzles in the macroeconomic data such
as why the productivity acceleration
witnessed in the United States since the
mid-1990s has not been reflected in
Europe. It may be that US firms have
organised their management structures in
a way that makes better use of ICT than
their European counterparts.
We first set the historical scene over
the last few decades, paying particular
attention to the end of the paradox
described by Nobel Laureate Robert Solow
whereby computers were ubiquitous but
seemed to have no effect on productivity.
Then we discuss firm-level evidence on the
impact of ICT on firm performance,
focusing on the role of the organisational
factors that make the difference between
ICT projects being a success and failure.
Finally, we delve into new research on the
impact of ICT in multinationals.
The bottom line is that economists
have confirmed what business leaders
have long known: the returns to ICT are
extremely variable and what makes the
key difference is the management and
organisation of the firm into which the ICT
is placed. 
The macro picture: Solow
paradox lost?
Labour productivity – or output per hour
worked – is the key indicator of material
wellbeing as it allows sustainable income
and consumption growth (which can be in
the private sector or the public sector).
Over the last 60 years, roughly three
periods can be distinguished.
The first one, starting after the Second
World War, was a period of strong
productivity growth in the developed
world, interrupted in the mid-1970s after
the first oil shock. Despite this slowdown
in productivity growth, between the mid-
1970s and the mid-1990s, Europe
continued to catch up with US productivity
levels and some countries even overtook
the United States. This was the era of the
‘Solow paradox’: the observation that we
could see computers everywhere except in
the disappointing productivity statistics.
Since the mid-1990s, a new picture
has emerged. The US economy
experienced a rebound in productivity
growth almost back to the levels seen
between 1945 and 1973. Productivity
growth continued to surge ahead even in
the face of the bursting of the high-tech
bubble in 2000 and the terrorist attacks of
9/11. By contrast, European countries did
not have a productivity acceleration and
the long catching-up process ground to a
halt.
ICT matters for understanding the US
‘productivity miracle’. Imagine we split the
economy into three sectors: industries that
intensively produce ICT (such as semi-
conductors and computing); sectors that
intensively use ICT (such as retail,
wholesale and finance); and all other
sectors in the economy. Surprisingly, it
turns out that the ICT-producing and ICT-
It ain’t what you do,
it’s the way that you do I.T.
It’s taken a long time to confirm that computers
boost productivity. But as Nick Bloom,
Raffaella Sadun and John Van Reenen show,
the key to their success seems to lie in
management – and that’s where US firms have
been far more effective than their European
counterparts.
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using sectors essentially account for all of
the acceleration in US productivity (see
Stiroh, 2002a).
This is shown in Figure 1, which
presents the acceleration in productivity in
US and European productivity growth
since 1995. Beginning with the US picture
on the left hand side of the figure, we see
that productivity growth accelerated by
3.5 percentage points a year in the ICT-
using sectors: from 1.2% pre-1995 to
4.7% post-1995. It also accelerated by 
1.9 percentage points in the ICT-producing
sectors. But there was actually a 
small deceleration in all the other sectors
of the economy.
Lying behind this was the enormous
fall in the quality-adjusted prices of ICT
since 1995, which has its roots in technical
progress in the semi-conductor industry.
Rapid improvements in the power of semi-
conductors led to big increases in
productivity growth in the ICT-producing
sectors. Moore’s Law (a rule of thumb for
the rate at which computer power
increases) seemed to accelerate after 1994
and the resulting fall in the price of a key
input lowered prices across a whole range
of products in the ICT-producing sectors.
As the price of ICT products 
plunged, firms deepened their use of 
ICT capital and this was naturally strongest
in sectors that intensively used ICT. 
Increasing ICT per hour increased output
per hour tremendously.
Looking at Europe, we also see a 
big increase in annual productivity growth
rates in the ICT-producing sectors of 
1.6 percentage points. The big difference
between the United States and Europe is
in the ICT-using sectors: in Europe, there
was no productivity acceleration in the late
1990s as there was in the United States.
Productivity growth remained static at
about 2% a year.
Since ICT is available throughout the
world at broadly similar prices, this raises a
puzzle: why were European firms not able
to reap the same benefits from ICT as
their US counterparts? To answer this, we
have to delve beneath the macroeconomic
numbers into the firm-level evidence.
The microeconomic picture:
paradox regained?
Advances in computer technology have
enabled large datasets on company
productivity and ICT to be amassed; they
have also improved the ability of
economists to analyse these data. The
basic methodology to assess the return to
ICT is to analyse a ‘production function’:
the researcher will try to account
statistically for the output of the firm with
a large number of inputs, the input of
most interest being ICT.
Since ICT is one form of capital, it is
important to control for other forms of
non-ICT capital, such as buildings, vehicles
and non-ICT equipment. Labour and
material inputs also have to be controlled
for as well as other factors such as plant
age, location and the state of the
business cycle. The best studies use
longitudinal data where the same firms
are followed over time so the researcher
can see if a burst of ICT capital is
followed by a burst of productivity after
controlling for other factors.
Several interesting findings have
emerged from this research programme.
First, on average, ICT does appear to be
significantly associated with higher firm-
level productivity. This stands in contrast
with some of the earlier industry- and
macro-level studies that struggled to find
any effect of ICT on productivity. The
ICT-using sectors
ICT-producing sectors
Non-ICT sectors
3.5
United States European Union
1.9
-0.5
-0.1
1.6
-1.1
Figure 1:
Changes in annual growth rates in output per hour from
1990-95 to 1995-2001 (percentage points)
Source: O’Mahony and Van Ark (2003)
The US productivity
‘miracle’ has been
strongest in sectors 
like retail and 
wholesale, which use 
ICT intensively
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reason why the industry-level studies found
little impact may have been because the
industry averages disguise large differences
between firms within industries.
Second, the magnitude of the
association between ICT and company
productivity is substantial. If ICT was simply
a ‘normal’ form of capital earning the
usual market return, we would expect that
a doubling of the ICT capital stock would
increase output by approximately the share
of ICT in total revenues. Since the relevant
share was only about 1 or 2% in most
studies, it is interesting that they appear to
find effects much greater than this. The
meta-analysis of 20 studies reported in
Stiroh (2002b) finds an average ICT
elasticity of 5%, suggesting that a
doubling of the ICT stock increases
productivity by 5%. This would seem to
suggest that there are some special
features of ICT compared with other forms
of capital.
Third, there is a huge variation around
the average impact of ICT on firm
productivity between different studies.
Stiroh (2002b) reports estimates ranging
from an upper end of over 25% to
negative 5%. Some of these differences
are due to methodological differences. But
it is more likely that a large amount of this
variation is due to genuine differences in
the impact of ICT across firms and this is
reflected in the different results from
different datasets.
To understand this heterogeneity, we
must move beyond looking only at
technology and investigate other features
of the firm.
Beyond ICT: the role of
complementary factors
An important reason why the returns to
ICT differ across firms is that different firms
have very different organisations into
which ICT is placed. Often ICT spending is
only the tip of the iceberg, and there are a
whole host of other investments made in
the firm to enhance the use of ICT (such as
consultancy expenses).
Skills are also important. There is a
great deal of evidence that educated
workers tend to be much better at coping
with the uncertainties of new ICT systems
than less skilled workers. Other
organisational factors such as
decentralisation of decision-making and
the steepness of the managerial hierarchy
have been found to be important. Old-style
‘Taylorist’ organisations with rigid
centralised hierarchies have, on average,
produced lower returns to ICT than more
‘organic’ flexible firms.
Whether firms make these investments
in complementary organisational capital
seems to be very important. Bresnahan et
al (2002) examined the impact of ICT on
productivity in over 300 large US
companies. A doubling of the ICT stock
was associated with an increase in
productivity of 3.6%, but this increased to
5.8% if a firm became more decentralised
(in their study, a one unit increase on a
decentralisation index based around
teamwork and autonomy of workers).
Although this literature is in its early
stages as it is tricky to quantify these
organisational and managerial factors, the
research suggests that other factors
interact with the use of ICT, which cannot
be studied in isolation.
The role of global businesses:
US multinationals do IT better
One stylised fact emerging from the study
of within-firm productivity is that
establishments owned by multinational
firms are more productive than
establishments of wholly domestic firms.
This is not surprising as multinationals
have to be more efficient in order to start
operating outside their home market.
What is more interesting is that
establishments owned by US
multinationals appear to be more
productive than those of non-US
multinationals. This is true both within the
United States and in other countries.
As an example of the evidence for this
stylised fact, Figure 2 shows data from over
7,500 establishments located in the UK,
which we have studied (see Bloom, Sadun
and Van Reenen, 2005). In terms of value
added per worker, US multinationals are
23% more productive than the industry
average, non-US multinationals are 16%
more productive than the industry average
and domestic establishments are about
11% less productive. In terms of output
per worker, the US advantage over
domestic firms is 21.5% and the non-US
advantage is 17.5%.
This is consistent with evidence that
the plants of multinational US firms are
more productive whether the plants are
based on US soil or foreign soil. The US
productivity advantage is partially linked to
greater use of inputs: US establishments
use about 10% more materials and 4%
more non-ICT capital than non-US
multinationals. But Figure 2 shows that ICT
capital may also be a very important factor:
US firms use a whopping 40% more ICT
capital per worker than average whereas
non-US multinationals use only 20% more. 
But this difference in the usage of ICT
is only one part of the story. When
estimating a production function, we find
that US establishments are 8.5% more
productive than domestic firms after
accounting for labour, non-ICT capital,
materials and a host of other factors.
Controlling for the fact that US firms
use more ICT accounts for only one
percentage point of this gap. What matters
is the way that US firms use ICT. A
doubling of the ICT stock is associated
Employment Value added
per employee
Non-IT 
capital 
per employee
IT 
capital 
per employee
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Figure 2:
Characteristics of establishments in the UK by ownership
type (percentage differences from four-digit
industry averages in 2001)
Notes: data from 576 US multinationals, 2,228 non-US multinationals and 
4,770 domestic establishments
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with an increase in productivity of 5% for
a US firm but only 4% for a non-US firm.
US firms appear simply to get more
productivity out of the same amount of
ICT (and this does not seem true of non-
ICT capital).
A second interesting finding in our
study is that the bigger returns to ICT usage
for US firms are only found in certain
sectors of the economy. These are exactly
the same ICT-using sectors of wholesale and
retail that account for the US productivity
miracle. In other words, it is only in the ICT-
using sectors in Figure 1 where US firms’
ICT productivity is much higher.
Why are the returns so much higher
for US firms? We investigated a wide
variety of hypotheses such as whether the
US firms simply had more skilled workers
or better software. These do not seem to
be the culprits. We suspect the main
reason lies in the managerial structure of
US firms.
In joint work with McKinsey & Co (see
Bloom, Dorgan et al, 2005, and the
Summer 2005 issue of CentrePiece), we
scored firms in four countries (France,
Germany, the UK and the United States) on
a range of managerial ‘best practices’,
including incentives such as merit-based
promotion and pay, the use of lean
manufacturing techniques, performance
management and effective targets. Across
all firms, US firms are on average
significantly better managed than
European firms.
Looking within Europe at US
subsidiaries, we also find that they are
significantly better managed than non-US
subsidiaries and domestic firms. What’s
more, US subsidiaries are also much more
likely to allow greater autonomy to
employees, a factor associated with higher
returns from ICT. This suggests that what
gives US firms their advantage are the
organisational and managerial structures
that they have that are conducive to
getting the most out of ICT.
Taken together, these findings suggest
that a reason for the slower growth of
productivity in ICT-using sectors in Europe
is that US firms have better internal firm
organisation to get more from their ICT. 
Changing European business
practices
So why do European firms not adopt more
US-style forms of business organisation?
There is some evidence that they are doing
so. For example, the Wal-Mart system of
supply chain management has been
explicitly copied by Tesco, the UK’s largest
supermarket. It has also been transplanted
directly as Wal-Mart has acquired Asda,
which is now the UK’s second largest
supermarket.
But organisational changes are large
and costly events so change is often slow
and difficult. Furthermore, there are
regulatory and cultural constraints to
adopting US business practices in Europe –
although these should not be overstated as
US multinationals like Starbucks and
McDonald’s appear to be able to do as
well in their European outlets as they do
back home.
A deeper question is whether European
firms really should change so radically? The
older organisational forms served Europe
well during the post-war catching-up
period and it may be that as the new
technologies bed down, they will again
prove themselves reliable. On the other
hand, if we have genuinely entered a new
phase of development where individual
performance, flexibility, decentralisation and
general education are needed, then such
complacency could be fatal.
Conclusions
The rebound of US productivity growth has
been a major economic development over
the last decade. This ‘miracle’ seems to be
linked to ICT as the productivity
acceleration was particularly strong in
those sectors that used ICT intensively such
as retail and wholesale. Europe did not
experience this acceleration in the same
sectors.
We have shown that the bulk of the
evidence from firm-level, microeconomic
studies is that ICT does have an
economically and statistically significant
impact on productivity but this varies
dramatically between firms: having the
right organisation helps a lot in making the
most of ICT.
We have suggested that these
organisational differences also lie behind
the different productivity performance
between the United States and Europe –
US firms are better placed to take
advantage of ICT. It is likely that European
firms will have to adopt more US-style
business processes to obtain the same level
of productivity advances. This is probably
simply a matter of time. The question is
how long will it take? 
Nick Bloom is assistant professor of
economics at Stanford University and director
of CEP’s research programme on productivity
and innovation. Raffaella Sadun is a
research economist in the programme. John
Van Reenen is director of CEP and professor
of economics at LSE.
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Mamma’s boys?
Why most young Italian men
live with their parents 
Italian men – and Italian women too –
tend to live much longer with their parents than adult
children anywhere else in the West. In Britain, roughly five
out of every ten men aged between 18 and 30 live with
their parents. In the United States, the proportion is four
out of ten. But in Italy, it is eight out of ten. 
This high – and apparently increasing – propensity of
young Italians to live with their parents is associated with
at least three other striking facts that have characterised
the Italian economy over the past two decades: extremely
high youth unemployment; low and declining fertility; and
low and declining migration rates. These facts are unlikely
to be uncorrelated.
The prevailing rhetoric is that Italian parents are altruistic.
Many of their children are unemployed and with no
entitlement to unemployment benefits, or they find
themselves jumping from one badly paid precarious job to
another. So they are allowed to live at home until they
become independent and get some stability in their lives.
Indeed, children have no choice but to live with their
altruistic parents: the family provides the support and
insurance that the welfare state does not. In the absence
of this support, young Italians would be unequivocally
worse off. 
Our research challenges this view. We argue that one
important and neglected factor explaining these
remarkably high rates of co-residence is that Italian
parents like having their children around and are willing to
‘bribe’ them into cohabitation in exchange for some
monetary transfers. Italian parents benefit from the
companionship and other services their children provide,
and most importantly, from the opportunity they have to
get their children to ‘conform’ to their precepts when they
live together.
To corroborate our claim, we present evidence that,
everything else equal, Italian parents report that they 
are happier when living with their adult children. This 
is the opposite of what happens in Britain and the 
United States. 
The outcome of this process, we argue, is that children –
who would rather live on their own – accept cohabitation
in exchange for the bribe. Paradoxically, it is cohabitation
that produces higher youth unemployment rather than
the other way round: children tend to have lower
incentives to find their own way in the labour market. The
price young Italians pay in exchange for higher
consumption today is lower independence and possibly
lower lifetime satisfaction.
Our idea is related to a wider debate among social
scientists studying Italy. For example, Harvard
anthropologist Edward Banfield coined the term ‘amoral
familism’ in his book The Moral Basis of a Backward
Society, first published in the 1950s. This described
(southern) Italians’ restricted pursuit of family interests and
their ensuing lack of civic engagement. One possibly
unwanted consequence of this emphasis on family
relationship is to curb children’s independence, possibly
making them worse off.
And in his celebrated 1997 book Meno ai padri, piu ai figli
(‘Less to fathers, more to children’), Nicola Rossi, a
Italian parents like having their adult
children around and are willing to
‘bribe’ them to stay at home
in brief...
It is a cliché that Italian children are particularly attached to
their mothers, even when they’re grown up. New research
by Marco Manacorda and Enrico Moretti investigates why
so many of them are still living with their parents.
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professor at the University of Rome and an MP from the
Democratic Party of the Left, showed how Italian public
welfare is remarkably skewed towards the older
generations: too much spent on pensions, he argues, and
too little welfare for young people. It follows that
entitlement to welfare (and jobs) endows parents with
remarkable bargaining power towards their children. 
The empirical strategy we use to test our hypothesis is
straightforward. We argue that cultural preferences are an
important determinant of the high rates of co-residence
between parents and adult children. But these preferences
would not translate into reality if parents were unable to
get their children to behave according to their tastes. So if
parents do indeed like to live with their children, we
should observe that as their income increases (and
keeping everything else equal), rates of co-residence
should increase.
This is precisely what we find in our study. We use the fact
that owing to major social security reforms in Italy during
the 1990s, a certain generation of parents was forced to
postpone their retirement. Had they been able to retire,
most of these parents would have probably chosen to do
so. But in exchange for some of their free time, these
parents saw a temporary increase in their income.
We compare the children of these parents with otherwise
observationally identical children, that is, children of
parents who were not affected by the reforms. The
advantage of this empirical strategy is that it makes it
possible to identify changes in parents’ income that
happened to affect only one cohort of parents and that
are unlikely to be correlated with other determinants of
parents’ and children’s decision on co-residence, such as
local housing prices and the state of local labour
demand.
We find that this temporary increase in parental income
was associated with a rise in co-residence rates. A 10%
increase in parents’ income resulted in an increase of
approximately 10% in the proportion of adult children
living at home. Interestingly, US-based economists Mark
Rosenzweig and Kenneth Wolpin find in contrast that in
the United States, cohabitation rates tend to fall as
parental income rises. 
Although this result does not necessarily rule out
alternative explanations, it is consistent with our ‘bribery’
story. When parents have more money, they buy more of
their children’s co-residence. If parents would rather live
on their own, they would probably help their children to
gain their independence as they become better off.
In sum, we think that Italian parents put quite a lot of
effort into being loved by their children. And to some
extent, they buy this love in exchange for their children’s
giving away some of their independence. Although this
might at first sight appear like a mere curiosity, we argue
that it has profound economic and social implications.
A 10% rise in Italian
parents’ income leads to a
10% rise in the proportion
of children living at home
This article summarises ‘Intergenerational
Transfers and Household Structure: Why do
Most Italian Young Men Live with their
Parents?’ by Marco Manacorda and Enrico
Moretti, CEP Discussion Paper No. 536
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
DP0536.pdf) and forthcoming in the Journal
of the European Economic Association.
Marco Manacorda is at Queen Mary,
University of London and a research
associate in CEP’s labour markets
programme. Enrico Moretti is at the
University of California, Berkeley.
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policy robbery trends in the SCI and non-
SCI areas.
Fortunately, this is not the case as is
clearly illustrated in Figure 1, which shows
an index of the robbery rate in policy and
non-policy areas between 1982 and 2003.
Up to the introduction of the policy
(denoted by a vertical line), the robbery
rates in SCI and non-SCI areas followed an
extremely similar trend. The figure also
suggests a substantial crime reduction
effect of extra police resources as the
growth trend in the robbery rate was
reversed only in areas where the SCI was
introduced. 
Our research also compares year-on-
year differences in robbery rates across 
I
ncreasing police resources is often
perceived as a primary crime-
fighting tool. But there is little
hard evidence showing that more
police do in fact reduce crime.
The main reason for this is that it
has been difficult to disentangle the causal
relationship between the two: higher crime
usually means more police and vice versa.
As a consequence, many studies have
failed to find a relationship between the
two and some have actually reported a
positive association between police
resources and crime. Although some
researchers have used more sophisticated
techniques to unravel the real nature of
this relationship, there remains little or no
consensus on its direction.
The 2002 introduction of the Street
Crime Initiative (SCI) offers an opportunity
to answer the question more definitively.
The SCI allocated £48 million of extra
resources to ten of the 43 police forces of
England and Wales to combat street
crime, primarily robberies. Most of this
money was spent on police overtime and
additional staffing. As the SCI was
introduced in certain areas, but not in
others, it is possible to compare what
happened to robberies before and after
the introduction across areas so as to
evaluate the policy’s impact on robberies.
The SCI was introduced into the police
forces with the worst street crime problem
in the country, those that accounted for
more than 80% of total robberies. This
mode of selection rule could have proved
a problem if there were different pre-
New research by Stephen Machin and 
Olivier Marie finds that the Street Crime
Initiative, introduced in 2002, has been highly
effective in reducing the number of robberies.
Increased police resources can have a big
impact on crime rates.
Can more police resources
reduce crime?
The extra police
resources of the 
Street Crime 
Initiative 
had a strong 
impact in 
reducing 
robberies
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SCI and non-SCI areas so as to ensure that
we are really identifying a policy effect.
Figure 2 shows these ‘difference-in-
differences’ for year-on-year comparisons.
The effect for the first SCI policy year is by
far the most negative one and clearly
different from zero, indicating that a step
change occurred in robberies once the
policy was in place. 
To obtain precise estimates of the
effect of the SCI on robberies, we use
recorded crime data for the 376 ‘crime
and disorder reduction partnerships’ of
England and Wales from 1999/00 to
2003/04. These have boundaries
corresponding to administrative local
authorities and we match a number of
area socio-economic characteristics from
the 2001 Census and the Labour Force
Survey to this panel. These socio-economic
characteristics are important as we find
that they explain most of the difference in
pre-policy robbery rate levels between the
policy and non-policy areas. 
Comparing all the areas and their
characteristics for the year prior to
introduction of the SCI (2001/02) and the
two following years (2002/03 and
2003/04), we estimate that the SCI
decreased robbery rates by 29%. But
because 2001 was a peak year in terms of
robberies in the SCI areas, we could be
overestimating the effect of extra police
resources by limiting our pre-policy sample
to this potentially abnormal year.
We therefore adopt a more
conservative approach and decide to drop
the year prior to introduction from our
sample and use instead the two previous
years (1999-2000) as the pre-policy period
for our analysis. The new estimate of SCI
effect on robberies is smaller but still very
important at 17.4%. 
We can be even more stringent and
drop from our sample those crime and
disorder reduction partnerships that
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This article summarises ‘Crime and 
Police Resources: The Street Crime Initiative’ 
by Stephen Machin and Olivier Marie,
CEP Discussion Paper No. 680
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0680.pdf)
Stephen Machin is CEP’s research director.
Olivier Marie is a research assistant in CEP’s
labour markets programme.
exhibit socio-economic characteristics so
different that they cannot be compared
across SCI and non-SCI areas. We find this
to be the case for 29 areas. The new
estimates are again relatively smaller but
still show an important 14.8% effect of
the SCI on robberies.
The ten forces that received extra SCI
funding were relatively free to implement
the policy in the way they thought best as
long as it was to combat street crime. This
may explain why, when we estimate
different SCI effects for groupings of
police forces where the policy was
introduced, we find decreases in robbery
rates ranging from 7 to 23 percentage
points. This result deserves further
investigation to understand how extra
police resources should be used to
maximise their effect on crime reduction.
So the extra police resources of the
SCI did reduce robberies, the crime it was
targeting. But this still does not
automatically imply that the SCI was a
socially beneficial policy. First, we must
consider the costs of the SCI with respect
to its crime reduction benefits. Second, we
must also think of what are known as
possible ‘displacement’ or ‘diffusion’
effects of the policy. 
There are two possible types of
displacement. First, as the police in SCI
areas focus on robberies and perhaps
divert resources to combating them, it is
possible that criminals will substitute this
crime for burglaries or vehicle crimes,
which have become relatively less
monitored. Second, there may be
displacement from SCI areas to nearby
non-SCI areas where the chances of being
caught for a robbery are lower. 
On the other hand, there could be
some diffusion of the policy to other
crimes within SCI areas, as the extra police
resources not only reduce robberies but
also other crimes. Diffusion of the SCI
effect to neighbouring non-policy areas is
also conceivable if the increased
identification and incapacitation of
criminals benefits all areas. We consider all
these possible effects for their potential
impact on our cost-benefit analysis. Finally,
we want to see the variation of these
costs and benefits across SCI areas.
To calculate the benefits of the SCI,
we use our estimates for the full and
reduced sample to find how many
robberies were avoided as a result of the
policy. As Table 1 shows, the number is
between 10,846 and 12,751 for the year
after introduction.
To cost these figures, we multiply this
reduction in robberies by the average cost
of a personal robbery, which the Home
Office estimates to be £12,094. Once we
subtract from these figures the cost for
one year of the SCI, we find high net
social benefits of the policy of between
£107 and £130 million. This is very large
as it represents four to five times the
initial input.
We also check for displacement 
or diffusion effects of the policy but do
not find them to be significant and
therefore do not have to revise our 
cost-benefit estimates. 
When we consider differences of cost
and benefits across SCI areas, using the
different effects we estimate, we find it to
be extremely socially beneficial in certain
areas. We also find some diffusion effect
on vehicle crime, which also decreases as
a result of the SCI in the areas that
experienced the highest reductions in
robbery rates.
Table 1:
Cost-benefit calculations for the year following
introduction of the Street Crime Initiative (SCI)
Control years: 1999/00 and 2000/01
Effect on robberies in percentage terms
SCI areas baseline number of robberies – average recorded
in control years
Robberies reduction in SCI areas – baseline effect
Benefits from robbery reduction in SCI areas – effect
baseline £12,094 (£ millions)
Average annual cost of SCI over 2002/03-2003/04 
(£ millions)
Net social benefit (£ millions)
All sample
-17.4
73,282
12,751
154.2
24.1
130.1
Reduced sample
-14.8
73,282
10,846
131.2
24.1
107.1
The policy has
been highly cost
effective with a net
social benefit of
between £107 and
£130 million a year
Just a year after
introduction of the 
policy in 2002, more 
than 10,000 robberies
had been avoided
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This article summarises ‘Immigrants at
Retirement: Stay/return or “Va-et-vient”?’ 
by Augustin de Coulon and François-Charles
Wolff, CEP Discussion Paper No. 691
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0691.pdf).
Augustin de Coulon is at the Institute of
Education, University of London and a
research associate in CEP’s labour markets
programme. François-Charles Wolff is at the
University of Nantes.
Immigrants in Europe:
will they return home 
when they retire?
Nearly a third of immigrants in Western
Europe intend to spend part of the year in their host
country and the rest back home when they retire. That at
least is the implication of analysis of a representative
sample of more than 6,000 immigrants currently living in
France, a significant proportion of whom plan to pursue a
previously undocumented strategy called ‘va-et-vient’
when they reach retirement age.
The study by Augustin de Coulon and François-Charles
Wolff finds that only a small proportion of immigrants
intend to return home when they retire (7%), while 
the majority (more than 60%) intends to stay in the 
host country.
Until now, immigrants’ likely location decisions at
retirement have barely been studied. But they have
important policy implications in such areas as healthcare
spending and aggregate consumption for both the home
and host countries. And the questions they raise are
imminent in many Western European economies, which
recruited immigrants heavily in the 1960s and 1970s:
individuals from these first immigration waves are now
approaching retirement age.
It might be thought that most of these immigrants will
return to their home country to enjoy a milder climate
together with the higher purchasing power of their
pensions and private savings. But what really influences
their location decisions? It turns out that since labour
market conditions do not matter so much at retirement,
location decisions are based less on comparison of wages or
employment opportunities across the host and home
country and more on the location of other family members.
This research explores the causal link between the location
of children and the location of retired parents, focusing in
particular on whether children drive their parents’ location
decision or whether parents make the decision first and
then encourage their kids to locate in the chosen country.
For parents who intend to stay in the host country or
return home, it is the current location of their children
that influences the decision. For those planning to ‘va-et-
vient’, the current location of their children is not of
primary importance – but simply having children makes
them more likely to ‘va-et-vient’.
Country of origin also has a big influence on immigrants’
location decisions. For example, the probability of
returning home is significantly higher for immigrants from
Southern Europe (8.6%) and Central and Southern Africa
(16.8%).
The probability of pursuing the ‘va-et-vient’ strategy is
higher for immigrants from Southern Europe, Northern
Africa and the Middle East. But it is less important for
women and highly educated people. It also becomes less
important the older immigrants are and the longer they
have lived in the host country.
As might be expected, household income has a positive
effect on the ‘va-et-vient’ decision. A simple explanation is
that increased housing and travel costs are associated with
‘va-et-vient’ so that poorer households are less likely to
share their time between two different countries.
Although these results are for immigrants in France, some
evidence points to similar patterns in other countries,
including Germany, Switzerland and the United States. In
an extension of this work, the researchers plan to look at
how intended location decisions are linked with the
remittances sent to the home countries. 
Only a small proportion of immigrants in Europe
intend to return home when they retire 
Many immigrants will ‘va-et-vient’
after retirement, sharing their time
between home and host countries
in brief...
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Evaluating ‘Excellence in Cities’
The government’s Excellence in Cities
policy has improved the educational outcomes for
secondary school pupils in disadvantaged areas, according
to new economic research by Stephen Machin, Sandra
McNally and Costas Meghir. But the study also shows that
the educational benefits are not equally distributed: the
most disadvantaged schools benefit and the effect is
concentrated among pupils of medium to high ability.
Excellence in Cities (EiC) has been one of the government’s
flagship education policies. Initially introduced in 1999 in
an effort to turn around the fortunes of inner city schools,
it has since been expanded to cover a third of all secondary
schools. Its three core strands involve funding for ‘learning
mentors’ to help pupils overcome educational or
behavioural problems; ‘learning support units’ to help
difficult pupils; and a ‘gifted and talented’ programme to
provide extra support for 5-10% of pupils in each school.
The CEP/IFS economic evaluation of the programme
compares the outcomes of pupils in EiC schools with
those in a comparison group outside the programme. It
finds that:
 The rate of improvement in EiC schools has been higher
than that of other LEA-maintained schools. This is true
even after controlling for different pupil and school
characteristics, such as prior attainment and pupil
numbers.
 EiC has led to an improvement of 1.9 percentage points
in the number of children reaching level 5 or above in
key stage 3 mathematics. The estimate is higher in
schools that have been in the programme the longest
but still evident in schools that came into the
programme later.
 There is no evidence of an effect on attainment in
English after controlling for pupil and school
characteristics. But the effects are positive for school
attendance: EiC has raised attendance by the equivalent
of one day per pupil in the first group of schools to
enter the programme.
 The positive effects of EiC have increased over time. The
effects are higher for more disadvantaged schools (as
measured by eligibility for free school meals) and
negligible for more advantaged schools.
 The effects of EiC are higher for pupils of medium to
high ability (as measured by attainment at age 11). For
example, it has delivered a 2.9 to 4.8 percentage point
increase in the number of pupils achieving level 5 or
above in key stage 3 mathematics for the most able
pupils in schools with the highest rate of deprivation.
This raises the question as to whether even bigger
effects might be generated if it were possible to target
resources more carefully. 
 The big question is whether the overall benefits of EiC
can be justified in terms of the per pupil cost. To know
this for sure requires observing pupils as they progress
through the education system and into the labour
market. But initial estimates suggest that the EiC policy
is potentially cost-effective. The relatively low cost of
the policy – £120 per pupil on average for each year –
suggests that the benefits do not have to be very large
to generate a positive outcome. 
in brief...
‘Excellence in Cities: Evaluation of an
Education Policy in Disadvantaged Areas’ by
Stephen Machin, Sandra McNally and Costas
Meghir is the final report of the economic
evaluation of EiC for the Department for
Education and Skills. The study was joint
work between CEP and the Institute for
Fiscal Studies (IFS). For the full report on
EiC, which includes analysis by
educationalists and economists, see:
http://www.dfes.gov.uk/research/data/
uploadfiles/RR675A.pdf 
The policy has raised attainment in maths
and improved school attendance
Excellence in Cities has improved
educational outcomes in our 
most disadvantaged urban schools
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A
s someone looking at
mental health in
Britain from outside
the profession, it is
clear that we are
doing far too little for
those who are mentally ill. I would like to
persuade you of four propositions:
 There is a mass of suffering that is
untreated and which imposes severe
burdens on the economy.
 We have effective means of treating it,
enshrined in guidelines from the
National Institute for Clinical Excellence
(NICE). But the guidelines cannot be
implemented with the resources of
people and money that are currently
available. In particular, evidence-based
psychological therapies like cognitive
behavioural therapy (CBT), which 
are in heavy demand, are not
adequately available.
 We could meet reasonable demand
within five to ten years by a major
programme to train more therapists. But
this will not be cost-effective unless we
maintain the quality of training and of
provision. This means that provision
should be through psychological
treatment centres, working on a ‘hub-
and-spoke’ basis.
 For many people, work is a vital part of
therapy and of the recovery process. But
at present, there are more mentally ill
people on incapacity benefit than the
total number of unemployed people.
The government’s ‘Pathways to Work’
pilots show that many of these people
can be helped back to work, and these
programmes should become available
throughout the country.
So these are my themes: the scale of
suffering and the cost; the existence of
known remedies; treatment centres to
provide these therapies; and the key
importance of work.
Suffering and cost
If you ask who are the unhappiest people
in our society, the answer is not the poor
but the mentally ill. You can see this from
the National Child Development Study,
which shows that unhappiness is three
times more closely related to mental
health (measured ten years earlier) than it
is to poverty (measured today). The cost to
the economy in terms of lost output is
around 2% of GDP and the cost to the
Exchequer is similar, including £10 billion
spent on incapacity benefit and £8 billion
on mental health services.
At present, most public expenditure on
mental health goes on the roughly quarter
of a million people suffering from
psychosis. But at any one time, there are a
million people suffering from clinical
depression and another four million
suffering from clinical anxiety.
For these groups, the depressed and
the fearful, there is almost no treatment
available except a few minutes with their
GP and some pills. Many of these people
do not want pills but they do want
psychological therapy. According to the
Psychiatric Morbidity Survey, under a half
of all the people suffering from
depression were receiving any kind of
treatment, and fewer than 10% were
receiving any kind of psychological
therapy. For people with anxiety, each of
these figures should be halved.
Mental health:
the choice of therapy for all
Richard Layard has spent much of his
professional life tackling unemployment and
inequality. But in his latest work, he argues
that mental illness is now Britain’s biggest
social problem.
This is totally unsatisfactory. If people
have any persistent physical illness like
asthma, high blood pressure or skin
disease, they automatically see a specialist.
But this is not the case if they suffer the
torment of mental illness.
There are two reasons for this neglect.
One is stigma. The other is an
extraordinarily delayed response to the fact
that we now have treatments that work,
which we did not have 50 years ago.
Treatments that work
We have drugs that will end a depressive
episode within four months for 60% of
sufferers. And we have therapies
(especially CBT) that will do the same as a
result of a weekly session. Once the
episode is over, relapse is less likely if the
sufferer received CBT, unless drug therapy
is continued. Thus, cost arguments are not
decisive between drugs and psychotherapy
– and many people do not want drugs for
the best possible reason: they want to feel
in conscious control of their mood.
For all these reasons, the NICE
guidelines on depression say that
‘cognitive-behavioural therapy should be
offered, as it is of equal effectiveness to
anti-depressants’. The NICE guidelines also
cite clear evidence that even in purely
economic terms, these treatments would
pay for themselves – ignoring altogether
the gain in happiness to the patient.
Yet as things are, the NICE guidelines
cannot be implemented because the
therapists are not available to meet the
demand. So the next phase of improving
our mental health services has to be based
on a simple offer: ‘Mentally ill people
should have the choice of evidence-based
psychological therapy’. The Labour Party’s
last election manifesto did not say quite
that but it said enough for it to be worth
discussing in concrete terms how such an
expansion could be achieved.
Training therapists
First, there is the need for more therapists.
A reasonable guess is that eventually in
any year, roughly one million people
would ask for therapy. If this lasted for ten
sessions, that would require roughly
10,000 more therapists.
There should be two main types of
therapist: clinical psychologists, who
would lead the new effort; and more
narrowly trained therapists, who would
receive two years of part-time training
while working in the NHS. Fortunately,
there is huge demand for places in
training as clinical psychologists, so it
should be possible to produce 5,000 more
of them within five to ten years. At the
same time, two-year training would be
offered to people with suitable experience
and credentials – mental health nurses,
social workers or occupational therapists –
provided that, once trained, they were
expected to change their job to become
full-time therapists. 
It is crucial that these people receive
sufficient depth of training to achieve the
success rates observed in the clinical trials.
There is no point at all in expanding
provision via second-rate therapy and it
would not be justified on economic
grounds – just as there is a major question
mark over much of the counselling that
GP practices currently provide for lack of
any other way to provide talking help to
their patients.
The case for treatment
centres
The training must be of good quality and
so must the actual treatment that is
provided. This raises the crucial question
about how treatment should be
organised. I suggest that there are five
main criteria for a good system of
delivering therapy:
 Patients should be able to be treated
near where they live.
 Therapists should practise within a
system of effective supervision and
professional management.
 They should be part of a team of
therapists, providing mutual stimulus
and support, and offering clear
prospects for professional advancement
based on recognised excellence.
 There should be a clear funding stream
to support the work based on national
targets for the availability of services.
This should not be left to the discretion
of primary care trusts.
 The pattern of expansion should be
similar enough in different areas for
people to learn about it, for example, in
the national media. 
These criteria cannot be satisfied
within a system of GP-led provision, and I
suggest that the new offer of therapy to
people with depression and anxiety
disorders be delivered through treatment
centres. Why?
 They would provide a much better
framework for the supervision of
casework and for in-service training and
professional development than would a
service run by GPs.
 They would make it possible to monitor
whether therapists were achieving
results through standard self-assessment
measures where results were made
available to the senior staff of the
centre.
 They would make it easier to organise
the right therapist for each patient, and
reduce the chanciness of whether their
own GP practice had the therapist they
needed. They would make it easier to
organise the effective use of human and
physical resources, due to economies of
scale.
 They could provide a route of self-
referral for patients who did not want
their GPs to know about their problem.
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There is a mass of
suffering that is
untreated and which
imposes severe burdens
on the economy
We desperately need a
better NHS, delivering more
help and understanding to
the mentally ill
The centres would be headed by a
psychologist/therapist and would
concentrate mainly on CBT. They would
be separate from community mental
health teams, which deal mainly with
more seriously disturbed patients.
There would within the next five years
be very roughly one centre per quarter of
a million population – or 250 centres in
all. A centre would have a central location
at which supervision, training and some
treatment occurred. But most of the staff
would spend at least half their clinical
time giving treatment on GP premises:
such staff would be jointly appointed by
the centre and the relevant GP practices.
A typical centre would have about 20-30
staff. The staff would operate under clear
NICE guidelines relating to number of
sessions, and patient progress would be
monitored using a standard national
system of recording completed at the
beginning of each session.
The treatment centres would be
chosen by a system of tendering
organised through the Department of
Health, and their funding would be
protected through the department. Trusts
and independent providers would be free
to tender. There would in due course be
waiting time targets.
In any major expansion, there is
always the danger of dumbing down, and
this is never a good idea. If it is not
possible within the next five years to
achieve the extra provision I propose, it is
better to expand quantity more slowly
while ensuring quality. If this means
establishing centres initially in the worst
deprived areas, so be it. These can
provide valuable experience and lessons
for further expansion.
But there must be a clear long-term
vision of where we want to be in ten
years’ time, with a phased path of how
we get from here to there. A newly
dreamed-up initiative every few years is a
certain recipe for dumbing down.
Pathways to work
We desperately need a better NHS,
delivering more help and understanding to
patients. But for many patients, work is
also a major route to recovery. And as
taxpayers who pay for incapacity benefits,
we can all say amen to this.
There are at least three obstacles to
overcome. First, doctors often find it easier
to counsel against work: they do not have
time to advise on employment problems.
Second, the benefit system is a real
problem: what if the job doesn’t work
out? And finally, employers and jobcentres
have not wanted to know.
But the government is trying to tackle
these problems through its Pathways to
Work pilots. When people come on to
incapacity benefit, they see an
employment adviser once a month in
months 3-8 for a work-focused interview.
And the NHS has to offer them training in
‘condition-management’: how they would
manage their condition if they were going
out to work. Moreover, GPs are lectured
on the merits of work.
The results have been astonishing. In
the pilot areas, the exit rate of people
from incapacity benefit within the first six
months of being on it has increased by
one half – one of the most successful
experiments I know of. On any
assessment, the economic benefits exceed
the costs. The scheme should clearly go
national. And employers everywhere
should become more friendly towards the
problems of mental illness – keeping
people in work as long as possible and
giving a second chance to those who have
had a break. The Health and Safety
Executive has a real role here.
Britain’s biggest social
problem
I have spent most of my life working on
unemployment. It was a national disgrace,
and it has still not gone fully away. But
mental illness is now our biggest social
problem – bigger than unemployment and
bigger than poverty.
We need our politicians to see it that
way, because that is how it seems to the
one third of the families in this country
affected in some way by poor mental
health. The politicians are now at least
beginning to look in the right direction.
But the test is how they act. 
Richard Layard is director of CEP's research
programme on wellbeing. He is also emeritus
professor of economics at LSE, a member of
the House of Lords and founder director of
CEP. This article is an edited version of the
inaugural Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health
Lecture delivered on 12 September 2005. The 
lecture draws heavily on two recent
publications by Richard Layard: Mental
Health: Britain’s Biggest Social Problem?
(http://www.strategy.gov.uk/downloads/
files/mh_layard.pdf) and Happiness: Lessons
from a New Science (Allen Lane, 2005).
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Treatment will help many people, but work
can also be a major route to recovery
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The part-time pay penalty
The majority of British women will
work part-time at some point in their lifetime, and around
45% of female workers in the UK are part-time.
Consequently, the types of jobs and the levels of pay and
conditions that are available on a part-time basis are of
crucial importance in influencing the economic
opportunities for women.
But although the overall pay gap between men and
women in the UK has fallen in the last 30 years, there is
an important difference in the fortunes of full- and part-
time women over this period. While the earnings of full-
time women have been rising relative to men’s, this is not
true of the earnings of part-time women. Indeed, the
part-time pay penalty has widened since 1975 (when it
was 10%) though most of the deterioration seems to
have occurred prior to the mid-1990s.
Figure 1 shows the gap in average hourly earnings
between full- and part-time women using data from the
New Earnings Survey/Annual Survey of Hours and
Earnings (NES/ASHE) for the period 1975-2005 and the
Labour Force Survey (LFS) for 1993-2005.
The estimates differ but both suggest a
very large part-time pay penalty: the
NES/ASHE indicates that in 2005,
average hourly earnings
among part-time women
were 29% below those of
full-time women; for the
LFS, the gap is somewhat
lower though still substantial
at 26%.
Of course, this average pay
differential between full- and part-
time women cannot be used as an
estimate of the pay penalty that would be suffered by a
given woman moving from full-time work to part-time
work. Women working part-time and women working
full-time are very different in their characteristics and do
very different jobs.
Compared with women who work full-time, part-time
women are more likely to have low levels of education, to
be in a couple, to have dependent children that are both
young and numerous, to work in small establishments in
distribution, hotels and restaurants and to be in low-level
occupations. Almost 25% of part-time women are shop
assistants, care assistants or cleaners. 15% of full-time
women are managers but only 4.4% of part-time women.
Taking account of differences in employers, the part-time
penalty for identical women doing the same job is
estimated to be about 10% without taking account of
differences in the occupations of full- and part-time
women and 3% taking account of these differences.
Hence, it is the difference in the occupations of full- and
part-time women that explains most of the pay
differentials between them.
So while the aggregate part-time pay
penalty has risen over time,
almost all of this rise can be
explained by the rising
contribution of
occupational segregation.
Women working part-time
have failed to match the
occupational upgrades made
by women who work full-time.
Rising UK wage inequality has
also acted to widen the pay gap
between women working part-
Women working part-time in the UK have hourly earnings
that are on average 26% less than women working full-
time. Alan Manning and Barbara Petrongolo investigate
what’s behind this part-time pay penalty.
Many women
working part-time
are not making full
use of their skills
and experience
in brief...
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time and women working full-time as it has widened the
pay gap between high-level and low-level occupations.
At the same time, there does seem to be a problem in the
fact that women who want to move from full-time work
to part-time work are often forced to change employer
and/or occupation. On average, women moving from full-
time work to part-time work make a downward
occupational move, evidence that many women working
part-time are not making full use of their skills and
experience. There is also evidence of under-utilisation of
the skills of women working part-time among women
with nursing and teaching qualifications.
Downward occupational mobility is less 
marked for women who change their hours without
changing their employer. But more research is 
needed on why employers do not make certain jobs
available on a part-time basis and whether some
combination of inertia, lack of imagination and prejudice
is also involved.
Women working part-time in other European Union
countries face similar problems to those in the UK. But the
UK has the highest part-time pay penalty and one of the
worst problems in enabling women to move between full-
and part-time work without occupational demotions.
At the same time, part-time work in the UK carries a
higher self-reported job satisfaction premium (or a lower
job satisfaction penalty) than in most other countries. And
part-time women in the UK do not actually report high
levels of under-utilisation of their skills.
Policy initiatives in recent years like the national minimum
wage (1999), the part-time workers regulations (2000)
and the right to request flexible working (2003) appear to
have had little impact on the part-time pay penalty as yet
although it is too early to make a definitive assessment of
the full impact of some of these regulations.
The most likely explanation of this is that, with the
exception of the right to request flexible working, none of
these policies are targeted at the routes by which part-
time women end up in low-level occupations. And the
right to request flexible working is quite weak in that it
allows employers many legitimate reasons for refusing
requests.
But it seems likely that more moves in this direction –
strengthening women’s rights to move between full- and
part-time work without losing their current job and
breaking down barriers to the availability of high-level jobs
on a part-time basis – that will be the most effective way
to reduce the part-time pay penalty.
This article summarises ‘The Part-time 
Pay Penalty’ by Alan Manning and 
Barbara Petrongolo, published by 
the Women and Equality Unit of the
Department of Trade and Industry
(http://www.womenandequalityunit.gov.uk/
research/part_time_paypenalty.pdf) and also
available as CEP Discussion Paper No. 679
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0679.pdf)
Alan Manning is professor of economics at
LSE and director of CEP’s research
programme on labour markets.
Barbara Petrongolo is a lecturer in
economics at LSE and a research associate in
CEP’s labour markets programme.
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Differences in the
occupations of full- 
and part-time women
explain most of the pay
differentials between them
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M
ore than half of
all young people
in the UK do not
go on to
university. Our
research
programme has examined the routes these
young people take – or do not take – to
higher levels of skills and education, their
motivation (or lack of it), the quality of
education and training they receive and
the contribution of employers and colleges
to their success. 
One of our central conclusions is that
at present, all our efforts to improve post-
16 education and training, including
apprenticeships, are seriously weakened by
what happens pre-16. Specifically,
pedagogic style and curriculum rigidity for
young people up to the age of 16 are
resulting in significant disaffection and
under-achievement.
The most damaging manifestation is
the reluctance of a significant proportion
of school-leavers to continue to engage
with any sort of formal learning. This
undermines all our efforts post-16 – and
apprenticeships in particular. 
Disengagement 14-16
Young people’s disengagement from
education is not a new phenomenon. But
changes in the demand for skills and the
importance of lifelong learning, together
with a more inclusive employment and
social agenda, have made it a high policy
priority. Hence the need to estimate the
size of the challenge presented by
disengagement and to distinguish the
variety of needs of those in this group. 
Disengaged learners fall into two
categories, for which different solutions
may be needed: those who are
disengaged but are achieving at or above
their potential; and those who are
disengaged and under-achieving. The
disengaged are located within the broad
group who achieve fewer than five GCSE
A*-C grades at age 16. This is made up of
three groups.
The first is a very small group of young
people (1-2% of each cohort) who have
practically lost contact with school
between 14 and 16. This group – the ‘out
of touch’ – appears to make some
progress through individualised alternative
provision that provides one-to-one
contact, an adult and supportive approach
and new opportunities to mark progress
through certification. But success in even
the best of these programmes is mixed
and OFSTED (the Office for Standards in
Education) has expressed deep concern
about variability in the quality of provision. 
The size of the second, larger group is
difficult to estimate but it is probably
contained within the 20% of the cohort
who claim to have no GCSE qualifications
at ages 17-19. These young people can be
characterised as ‘disaffected but in touch’
and they appear to respond to a wide
range of initiatives that take them out of
school into a further education, work-
related or leisure setting.
Evidence for improved attainment and
progression to further education and
training for this group is again mixed.
OFSTED is cautious about this type of
intervention (stressing the need for careful
planning and monitoring of work
placements) but, with some provisos,
considers that well configured work-based
learning may contribute to re-engagement
and improved performance. 
The third group is also difficult to
quantify but approximates the further
20% who gain one or more (but fewer
CEP’s Skills for All research programme has
been looking at the life choices and life chances
of the many young people in the UK who do not
go to university. Hilary Steedman summarises
the key findings and what they mean for recent
government initiatives to improve vocational
education and upgrade the nation’s skills base.
Skills for all
We need to develop 
a vocational route to 
level 3 skills and 
higher education
than five) grade C or higher GCSE passes.
Within this ‘1-4 A-C grade’ group, some
may have reached their full potential, but
others will be capable of much more if
interest and enthusiasm can be aroused.
This group has been targeted by many
initiatives that offer new/improved
vocational subjects and qualifications,
which allow students to demonstrate
aptitudes and capabilities that are not
required by more ‘academic’ subjects.
OFSTED has expressed concern about the
capacity of schools and teachers to offer
such courses to the standard required.
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that
such vocational courses can have a highly
motivating effect on students’
performance.
‘Increased flexibilities’
Increased Flexibilities is a £120 million
government programme aimed at creating
enhanced vocational and work-related
learning opportunities for 14-16 year olds
who can benefit most, including provision
of new GCSEs in vocational subjects. Our
research finds encouraging evidence that
the programme has reawakened interest
in learning post-16 and we hope that the
variety of learning location and choice that
the programme makes available can be
extended nationwide as soon as possible.
In particular, the research shows that
including vocational courses and work-
related learning pre-16 leads, in many
cases, to: improved motivation among
young people said, previously, to be
lacking in motivation or to be potentially
disaffected or disengaged; improved
attendance and behaviour; and improved
confidence and self-esteem. There are also
indications of a greater preparedness for
post-16 studies, especially among young
people studying vocational courses pre-16
at colleges.
Our qualitative research undertaken
with 17 post-16 students in three colleges
of further education largely supports
these findings in terms of the perceived
impact of pre-16 vocational experiences
on young people's motivation, attendance
and behaviour. The interviewees report
that the practical nature of the courses
increased their motivation and stimulated
their learning; that they preferred the
nature of teaching (with more individual
attention and more group work) and
student/teacher relationships in college;
and that their attendance and behaviour
at college improved as a result of being
involved in pre-16 vocational courses. 
International comparisons of
qualifications
So how does the UK’s performance in
producing skilled individuals compare with
that of other major industrialised
countries – France, Germany and the
United States – and an Asian tiger –
Singapore? Our ‘skills audits’ show that:
 In France and Germany, vocational
qualifications continue to play an
important role in enabling more young
people to reach level 2 (GCSE) and 
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Figure 1:
Percentages of national populations aged 25-28 at level 2 and
above by type of qualification held, 2002/03
Our efforts to improve 
post-16 education and
training are seriously
weakened by what 
happens pre-16
“duh!”
“like,
whatEVER...”
“boring!”
entering apprenticeships (see Figure 3).
But vocational education has suffered a
chequered history, being subject to many
different initiatives over the years, each of
which has had rather different purposes in
mind. This overlay of initiatives, courses,
qualifications and indeed philosophies has
resulted in: 
 a confusing plethora of qualifications,
with no image in the minds of young
people, parents and employers about
what vocational education involves;
 high degrees of non-completion with
switching between the many different
level 3 (A-level equivalent) and above
by age 25-28 (see Figure 1).
 In France, Germany and Singapore,
substantial proportions of higher
education qualifications are
vocational/applied. In the UK and the
United States, proportions with short
vocational/applied diplomas/degrees are
much lower.
 At level 3 and above for the 19-21 age
group, Germany had an advantage of
14 percentage points relative to the UK
in 1994 and the gap with the United
States was of a similar magnitude. The
gap with respect to Singapore was
slightly smaller. These gaps have now
disappeared.
 But for 25-28 year olds at level 3 and
above, not only the UK but also France
and Singapore have experienced rapid
growth with the result that the UK is
just about 'keeping pace' with those
countries rather than closing the gap
(see Figure 2).
 Qualification levels in the UK increase
much more slowly after ages 19-21
than in France and Germany. In the
latter countries, qualifications at level 3
and above increase substantially
between the ages of 19-21 and 25-28.
The rapid growth in qualifications of
19-21 year olds at level 3 and above in the
UK between 1994 and 1998 resulted from
the one-off rise in proportions gaining five
or more GCSE A*-C grades between 1988
and 1992. Since 1998, growth has halved
as post-compulsory enrolment rates have
flattened out. Measures proposed in the
Tomlinson Report – including a vocational
route to level 2 and level 3 – are urgently
needed to achieve another step-change in
the post-compulsory enrolment rate. 
The vocational route
The evidence from other countries shows
convincingly that a vocational route to level
3 skills and to higher education is essential
if 80% are to reach level 3 by age 25. To
provide a vocational route to level 3 skills,
employment and progression on to higher
education, we also need a full-time
vocational route to provide for the 20-30%
who have left school with some good
GCSE passes, currently take some
vocational courses but fail to reach level 3.
We therefore welcome the
government’s White Paper on 14-19
education and look forward to its rapid
implementation. But the experience of
other countries suggests that is important
not to lose sight of the need for:
transparency and clarity in order to
overcome information failure; substantial
practical vocational content and
mandatory work experience in the relevant
sector; and progression to level 3 and a
clear expectation that level 3 is the goal
even though a period of study longer than
two years may be required.
There are strengths in our system with
around 30% of 16 year olds opting for
full-time vocational programmes in school
or college, quite apart from the numbers
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Narrowing the gap: 25-28 year olds at level 3 and above
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Percentages of 16 and 17 year olds in education and training
courses and a dropping off of
participation at 17;
 poor linkages both between the various
types of vocational courses on offer, and
between them and vocational offerings
in higher education – a third of
vocational students are on courses that
could not lead to higher education,
either directly or through a further
related course;
 and poor linkages to the labour market,
which are not helped by the fact that
the industry bodies that are meant to
set standards have been reorganised
five times in the last 30 years and twice
in the last five years alone.
Other countries offer models of how
to constitute programmes of full-time
vocational education. These are common
in continental Europe, even in countries
that have a strong apprenticeship
tradition. There is no single recipe, but the
lessons for us are these:
 offering vocational courses both as
pathways in their own right and as
options that can be mixed with
academic subjects is unlikely to succeed;
 linkages with both higher education
and apprenticeship are both possible
and desirable;
 vocational education can be a
respectable option, and certainly is not
seen abroad, as it sometimes is here, as
an alternative to academic subjects for
those who are struggling at school;
 and the quest for ‘parity of esteem’
between academic and vocational
subjects is a wild goose chase – far from
raising the reputation of vocational
courses, it is likely to distort them and
make them pale imitations of academic
studies, with little purpose of their own. 
The way forward
The way forward is to develop substantial
national vocational programmes, perhaps
15-30 in all, each culminating in an award
at level 3, the first point at which
vocational education has a demonstrable
payoff in the labour market. These
programmes would: 
 be designed through genuine working
partnerships between industry,
awarding bodies, higher education and
vocational teachers;
 include a rich mixture of relevant
physical and social science subjects to
enable general education to be
continued in a natural manner;
 give access to the large array of
vocational subjects already present
within higher education;
 enable students to gain credits towards
‘advanced modern apprenticeships’ or
‘foundation apprenticeships’;
 and include an introductory stage for
young people with weaker GCSEs who
need to build up their skills, and mesh
in with preparatory programmes for
those under 16 who want to sample a
number of vocational options before
committing themselves.
These vocational programmes would
build on the structures and courses that
already exist, but ‘by gathering them
together’ make them much more
coherent. They would reflect the best of
successful practice abroad, where
vocational studies are more esteemed
than here and produce better results. 
And they would be consistent with
emerging proposals for an 'English
baccalaureate', providing the specialised
vocational variants that are envisaged
under this system. 
Apprenticeships
While apprenticeships have a leading role
to play in the provision of vocational
education and training, a number of issues
are still not satisfactorily resolved. Again,
comparisons with other countries offer
valuable lessons.
In continental Europe, apprenticeships
tend to be ‘demand-led’: employers take on
apprentices on the basis of their assessment
of their future skill requirements. Individuals
therefore get trained in relevant areas,
while firms get the skills that they need. But
in the UK, apprenticeship training is ‘supply-
led’: training providers receive government
funding to place young people with firms,
with the aim of achieving government
targets for numbers trained rather than to
respond accurately to local skill needs and
the aspirations of young people.
In continental Europe, apprenticeships
tend to have a common identity across
occupations, provided by statutory
regulation of their key features, such as
duration, standards and assessment. But in
the UK, there are widespread differences in
the quality of apprenticeships along these
dimensions, such that there is no single
definition of what an apprenticeship
actually is and what it entails. Some
apprentices are even unsure whether they
are involved in an apprenticeship scheme
or not.
There appears to have been little or no
improvement in the quality and quantity of
advice available to young people in school
and college on following a chosen career
by means of apprenticeship. Furthermore,
apprenticeship is now overwhelmingly 
a programme aiming at level 2 skills rather
than level 3. Elsewhere, vocational 
routes aim to take the majority to level 3
and our research shows good wage
returns to this level.
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Hilary Steedman is a senior research fellow
in CEP’s education and skills programme. She
co-directed Skills for All with Richard Layard
and Sheila Stoney of the National Foundation
for Educational Research. The programme
was core-funded by the Esmée Fairbairn
Foundation with additional financial support
from the Anglo-German Foundation and the
Economic and Social Research Council.
For further information on Skills for All, see:
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/research/skills/
skillsforall.asp).
“...cool.”
“yup.”
“brill.”
Vocational courses for 14-16 year
olds can have a highly motivating
effect on students’ performance
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Understanding 
labour markets
Chris Pissarides, professor of economics at 
LSE and director of CEP’s research programme on
macroeconomics, has been jointly awarded the IZA Prize in
Labor Economics 2005 with Professor Dale Mortensen of
Northwestern University.
The prize, awarded by the Institute for the Study of Labor
(IZA) in Bonn, honours the pioneering work of exceptionally
creative scholars who have revolutionised theoretical and
empirical research on labour markets. The prize committee
includes Nobel Laureates George Akerlof and Joseph
Stiglitz, and the previous winners are Jacob Mincer, Orley
Ashenfelter and Ed Lazear. Pissarides is the first European
scientist to receive this prestigious award.
Mortensen and Pissarides’s work has focused on developing
a better understanding of unemployment and job flows. In
particular, they have shown how the intensity with which
workers search for jobs and the timing of decisions of when
to accept a job offer determine the distribution of
unemployment durations.
The award team said: 'Professor Pissarides and Professor
Mortensen have been awarded the prize for their path-
breaking contributions to the analysis of markets with
search and matching frictions. The vast literature that was
stimulated by their fundamental contributions to search 
and matching theory is evidence of the power of their
approach to the analysis of interactions in labour markets,
marriage markets, housing markets, or generally all markets
with frictions.’
'Both their individual contributions and their joint
development of a dynamic equilibrium model of labour
markets account for much of the success of job search
theory and the flows approach in becoming a leading tool
for microeconomic and macroeconomic analysis of labour
markets. Their models, which are now widely used in labour
economics and macroeconomics, have highly enriched
research on unemployment as an equilibrium phenomenon,
on labour market dynamics and cyclical adjustment. Dale
Mortensen's and Christopher Pissarides's research on labour
market search and job matching has also significantly
directed and shaped the empirical literature.'
Commenting specifically on Pissarides’s work, they 
note: ‘[it]… has broken new ground in studying
macroeconomic implications of the flows approach to
labour market analysis by using the matching function as a
tool to study equilibrium unemployment… The matching
function relates job creation to the number of unemployed,
the number of job vacancies and the intensities with which
workers search and firms recruit. It successfully captures the
key implications of frictions that prevent an instantaneous
encounter of trading partners and has proved a particularly
powerful tool for modelling two-sided search frictions that
stem from information imperfections about potential
trading partners…’
‘Pissarides further developed the matching model, which is
at present the leading tool for studying imperfect labour
markets in macroeconomics, in subsequent studies of
equilibrium unemployment dynamics… [His work]
highlights the effects of cyclical productivity changes on
vacancy posting, labour market adjustment dynamics,
unemployment and wage dynamics. It rationalises why
vacancies respond more quickly and with greater amplitude
to shocks than unemployment, that real wage changes do
not fully reflect real output changes and that
unemployment responds faster to a negative than to a
positive shock.’
in brief...
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Lionel Robbins 
Memorial Lectures:
‘International Terrorism:
Causes and Consequences’
Speaker:
Professor Alan Krueger
Chairs: 
Richard Layard, Christopher Johnson
and Howard Davies (tbc)
6.00pm Tuesday 21, Wednesday 22 and
Thursday 23 February 2006
Old Theatre, Old Building, London School
of Economics, Houghton Street, London
WC2A 2AE
Free and open to all with no ticket
required. Entry is on a first come, first
served basis.
FAIR TRADE FOR ALL: HOW TRADE CAN
PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT
By Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew
Charlton
Oxford University Press
Price: £15.99 (Hardback)
ISBN-10: 0-19-929090-3
ISBN-13: 978-0-19-929090-1
Joseph Stiglitz and CEP’s Andrew Charlton offer a challenging
and controversial argument about how globalisation can
actually help Third World countries to develop and prosper. 
In Fair Trade For All, Stiglitz and Charlton address one of the key
issues facing world leaders today – how can the poorer
countries of the world be helped to help themselves through
freer, fairer trade? 
Vividly written, highly topical and packed with insightful
analyses, Fair Trade For All offers a radical new solution to the
problems of world trade. It is a must read for anyone interested
in globalisation and development in the Third World.
Joseph Stiglitz is University Professor at Columbia University and
co-founder and executive director of the Initiative for Policy
Dialogue. He is a winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics (2001).
Andrew Charlton is a research officer in CEP’s globalisation
programme.
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THE DE-COLLECTIVISATION OF PAY
SETTING IN BRITAIN 1990-1998:
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Discussion Paper No. 706
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Discussion Paper No. 709
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Discussion Paper No. 707
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